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Abstract 
 
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the US federal budget 
allocation to the states. Departing from the existing literature that gives prominence to 
Congress, we carry on an empirical investigation on the impact of Presidents during the 
period 1982-2000. Our findings suggest that the distribution of federal outlays to the 
States is affected by presidential politics. First, presidential elections matter. States that 
heavily supported the incumbent President in past presidential elections tend to receive 
more funds, while marginal and swing states are not rewarded. Second, party affiliation 
also plays an important role since states whose governor has the same political affiliation 
of the President receive more federal funds, while states opposing the president's party in 
Congressional elections are penalized. These results show that presidents are engaged in 
tactical distribution of federal funds and also provide good evidence in support of 
partisan theories of budget allocation. 
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“For republican governors, it means we have an ear in the White House, we have a
number we can call, we have access that we wouldn’t have otherwise had, and that’s of
course helpful” ( Gov. Mitt Romney, Washington Post, Monday, November 22, 2004)1
1. Introduction
The allocation of the federal budget in the United States is the outcome of a complex
process involving numerous institutional players. A vast theoretical and empirical litera-
ture has devoted a formidable eﬀort to the study of this process. The existing empirical
contributions primarily focus on congressional influence via powerful individual represen-
tatives, such as for example committee members, or via political parties. The executive,
however, also plays an important role in the budget formation: the president initiates the
process by sending a proposal to the Congress and, once the budget has been approved,
retains a veto power that can be overridden only by a qualified majority equal to 2/3 of
Congress.
Historically, the balance of power between president and Congress over the budget
has been subject to important changes. The authority of the executive over initiation of
the budget was first established by the Budget and Accounting act of 1921 that began a
long lasting period of domination of presidency over Congress. Following the escalating
conflict with the Nixon administration, the Congress tried then to regain control over the
budget through the Budget Impoundment and Control act of 1974. According to Schick
(1979), the 1974 reform “has the potential of altering presidential-Congress relationship
contributing to a resurgence of Congress”. A number of scholars, however, argue that the
president is still an influential player (Kiewiet and Krehbiel, 2000; Edwards, 1980 ) mainly
because of his veto power (Copeland, 1983; Rhode and Simon, 1985; Kiewiet and McCub-
bins, 1988; McCarty, 2000), since “merely the threat of a veto is often enough to force
Congress to tailor a bill conform to administration wishes”(Cumming and Wise,1981).
1Interview with Republican governor Mitt Romney, following the re-election of G.W. Bush in November
2004.
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In this paper we ask whether the president has a systematic impact on the allocation
of the federal budget to the states. Evidence of presidential influence on the territorial
distribution of federal funds has been provided by several studies on the New Deal pro-
gram. In particular, Wright (1974) and Wallis (1987), have found that states with high
volatility of presidential vote received more federal support, which is consistent with the
idea that the president might try to target swing voters2. On the other hand, Anderson
and Tollison (1991) and Couch and Shughart (1998) find a positive correlation between
Roosvelt share of votes in 1932 and spending at state level3 that is compatible with the
hypothesis of rewarding loyal rather than swing voters. Finally, Fishback et al.. (2003)
and Fleck (2001) find evidence in support of both hypotheses4.
While the New Deal has received great attention, there is a lack of empirical studies
on presidential influence after the 1974 reform. Is the presidential impact still relevant
or does Congress now dominate federal budget allocation? In this paper we attempt to
answer this question by providing new empirical evidence on contemporary federal budget
allocation to the states.
From a theoretical point of view, the executive may have several reasons to sway
the federal budget allocation away from a purely social welfare maximizing objective
(McCarty, 2000). Namely, the president may use budget allocation to enhance his re-
election chances either by targeting swing states or by rewarding his supporters. Lindbeck
and Weibull (1987 and 1993) provide theoretical models explaining why political actors
should redistribute funds to marginal and swing states in order to maximize their chances
of winning elections. Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue instead that, because of the
ideological relationship between voters and candidates, more funds should be allocated
where policy-makers have larger support. In particular, the targeting of loyal voters can
be seen as a safer investment as compared to aiming for swing voters. Hence, risk adverse
political actors that want to maximize the chances of winning elections, should allocate
2Stromberg (2004) shows, however, that these findings are not robust to the inclusion of state fixed
eﬀects.
3Anderson and Tollison (1991) also find evidence of committee influence on New Deal Spending.
4For an overview of the literature on New Deal spending see Couch and Shughart (1998) and Fishback
et al. (2003).
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more funds to loyal states. Dixit and Londregan (1996) provide an alternative model
where politician face incentives to target both swing and loyal voters. On the one hand,
moderate voters, who are indiﬀerent between two parties, can more easily be bought; on
the other, core supporters can be targeted in a more eﬃcient way because parties know
their preferences better.
Besides targeting specific groups of voters, the president could also try to further his
legislative agenda by directing spending to specific legislators. Moreover, “as a leader of
his party, he may feel the pressure to favor legislative districts controlled by members
of his party” (McCarty, 2000). Assuming that party reputation is a public good for
individual party members, Cox and McCubbins (1993) provide a theoretical explanation
for cooperation among representatives belonging to the same party5. Along the same
line, Dasgupta et al. (2004), argue that when the electoral returns from spending are
shared between state and central government, then transferring funds to a governor of
the opponent party generates a “leakage” eﬀect whereby the central government looses
part of the electoral benefit from spending. Finally, if state governments have some
discretion in the way funds are spent, then the federal administration could prefer to
allocate more funds to governors with the same policy preferences. All this seems to
suggest that the president has incentives to sway the allocation of federal funds in the
direction of “friendly” administrators.
This study will test these alternative theories of presidential influence. In particular,
we will first estimate the eﬀect of the presidential electoral race on the budget allocation
to find out whether the president rewards his supporters or whether he targets states that
are marginal or swing in presidential elections. Second, to uncover whether the president
diverts federal funds toward states controlled by members of his party, we will estimate
the eﬀect of partisan alignment between the president and the state governors and/or
state representatives.
The impact of the president as a party leader and, more generally, the distributive
5The evidence reported by the media on cooperation between party members is abundant. During
presidential campaigns a huge emphasis is placed, for example, on the ability of governors to deliver the
votes of their state.
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eﬀects of cooperation between representatives belonging to the same party, are impor-
tant theoretical questions that have not been explored yet by the empirical literature on
partizan budgeting, that tends instead to focus on the role of parties inside Congress.
Among the contributions on congressional partizan budgeting, Levitt and Snyder (1995)
find that, when Congress was dominated by democratic majorities, outlays at the district
level were positively correlated with the district share of democratic votes6. Similarly,
Carsey and Rundquist (1999) find that states represented by Democrats on a defense
committee receive more military procurement awards. Bickers and Stein (2000) find that
the Republican control of the 104th Congress altered the composition of federal outlays
in favor of programs that are more compatible with the interests of Republican represen-
tatives7.
One important advantage of our empirical analysis is that it relies on panel data on
federal outlays over a relatively long time span. The panel structure allows us to use state
fixed eﬀects to account for state-level unobserved heterogeneity and identify the eﬀect of
the relevant political and economic variables8. Since the president, unlike most other
individual players, can exercise his influence on any budgetary aggregate, we decided to
focus our attention on total federal outlays. This approach has its own drawbacks but, for
our purposes, also provides substantial advantages. Focussing on very specific aggregates,
as most literature does, makes it possible to shed light on specific forms of influence
and to be very precise on them. This is particularly true for studies on committees,
where distortions are more often found on specific spending programs. It is, however,
quite possible that the distortions introduced by diﬀerent actors with limited influence
may oﬀset each other leaving a state without a real advantage in the overall allocation
of federal funds. Since the presidential influence is not limited to particular aggregates,
6Evidence of a bias in favour of democratic districts is also reported by Owens and Wade (1984),
Alvarez and Saving (1997) and Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985). Some recent literature has investigated
the role of parties on budget allocation also in other countries. Dasgupta et al. (2001) find that Indian
states ruled by the same party that controls the central goverment receive more grants, while Dahlberg
and Johansson (2000) find that the Swedish regions that are “swing” in the national elections receive a
higher share of a specific transfer program.
7They find, for example, a remarkable increase in the pro-business contingent liabilities.
8When data on specific years are used instead, it is hard to say if the results obtained are merely due
to particular features of the data considered or to proper and long lasting political influence.
6
then it is more likely that a state can be favoured in the overall budget allocation for
reasons related to presidential politics. Therefore, total federal spending is the place
where the presidential influence is more likely to be detected. Focussing on whether a
state receives, on aggregate, more federal funds we are of course capturing only a particular
channel through which political actors may divert funds toward their constituencies. The
composition of the budget is another instrument that can be used to favour interests
located in a given constituency, as it is shown by Bickers and Stein (2000).
While we are primarily interested in the role of the president, we also incorporate
into the analysis the other relevant institutional players (Congress and committees) be-
cause excluding some explanatory variables in the regressions may lead to the well known
problem of omitted variable bias9. Therefore, we check the robustness of our results by
simultaneously estimating in the same regressions the impact of several channels of po-
litical influence that, according to previous studies, may crucially aﬀect federal budget
allocation. Following Atlas et al. (1995) and Lee (1998), we control for overrepresenta-
tion of small states in Congress. Furthermore, individual representatives occupying key
positions in the budget process can convey disproportionate amount of money to their
districts (Fenno 1973, Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1988) and according to several scholars,
committees are very influential in determining the budget allocation (Shepsle and Wein-
gast 1987) since they have an advantage both in terms of their agenda setting power
(McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1980) and in terms of information and competence10 (Kre-
hbiel, 1991). Hence, we follow the empirical literature on committee influence11 and
introduce committee membership in our analysis.
To briefly summarize our main results, we find that the president has an important
9When diﬀerent explanatory variables are correlated, as it seems reasonable to expect in most cases,
omitting relevant players could deliver biased estimates of the impact of those considered.
10Weingast and Marshall (1988) argue that committees are the devices that make logrolling work, by
facilitating the trade of influence in the absence of a spot market for the exchanging of support.
11The empirical literature on committee influence is vast and, although the results are sometimes
mixed, committee influence is usually found on specific spending categories rather than large spending
aggregates. Among the numerous studies on committees see Plott (1968), Goss (1972), Ferejohn (1974),
Ritt (1976), Strom (1975), Rundquist and Griﬃt (1976), Ray (1981), Kiel and McKinzie (1983), Rich
(1989), Anderson and Tollison (1991), Owens and Wade (1984), Alvarez and Saving (1997), Carsey and
Rundquist (1999), Levitt and Poterba (1999), Aldrich and Rhode (2000) Bond et al. (2004), Knight
(2004). For an overview on the Committee influence literature see Bond et Al (2004).
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impact on the allocation of the budget to the states. In particular, states that ideologically
lean towards the president, i.e. states with a high share of presidential votes or with a
governor belonging to the party of the president, tend to be rewarded with more funds.
On the other hand, states with a close presidential electoral race and states that either
changed political aﬃliation in the most recent election or that are historically volatile
do not receive more money. Hence, overall our analysis suggests that the president is a
relevant player as he can direct more funding toward those states that are run by “friendly”
governors and that have large groups of “core supporters”. Finally, our analysis indicates
that partisanship plays an important role since governors politically aligned with the
president receive more resources and Congress members opposing the president bring less
funds to their states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our
dataset and lays out our empirical approach. Section 2 presents our main results. In
section 3 we provide our conclusions.
2. Data and methodology
Following the theoretical literature on partizan budgeting (Lindbeck andWeibull,1987 and
1993; Dixit and Londregan,1996; Cox and McCubbins, 1986) and presidential influence
(McCarty, 2000; Kiewiet and Krehbiel, 2000) the hypotheses we want to test may be
summarized as follows:
H1: federal funds are disproportionately targeted to states that are marginal and
swing in presidential elections (swing bias);
H2: federal funds are disproportionately targeted to states where the president is
supported by a large share of the electorate (ideological bias);
H3: party alignment of state governors and/or Congress representatives with the
executive increases the receipt of federal funds (party alignment). For completeness,
we also check what is the impact of the alignment of governors and state representatives
with Congress majorities.
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We use data on federal outlays for the 48 US continental states from 1982 to 200012.
In Table 1 we report average per capita federal outlays during the period 1982-2000
(expressed in real $ for the year 2000). It is immediately clear that the diﬀerences in
spending can be substantial. An average resident of Virginia, for example, has received
every year almost $ 2,700 more than an average resident of Wisconsin. While this gap
can be entirely due to the needs and characteristics of the respective populations, it is
legitimate to ask how much of this diﬀerence can be due to purely political factors. For
this purpose we estimate the following equation:
FEDEXPst = αs + βt + θ1Pisw + θZst + st, (1)
s = 1, ...48; t = 1982, ...2000;
where FEDEXPst is the real per-capita federal expenditure (outlays) in state s at time
t. As in all the subsequent regressions, we include state fixed eﬀects and year dummies.
Zst is a vector that includes real income per capita, state population, unemployment rate,
percentage of citizens aged 65 or above and percentage of citizens between 5 and 17 years
old. We keep these explanatory variables in all the regressions as standard economic
and demographic controls. Finally, Pisw represents the set of institutional and political
variables under consideration13.
It is important to point out that in the US budget process there is a lag between
the appropriation of federal funds and the moment when these are actually spent. This
is relevant when estimating the eﬀect of particular institutional and political variables,
since current federal outlays have normally been appropriated in previous budgetary years.
Delays should therefore be taken into account. Hence, we introduce lagged values for Pist,
since past policy makers are responsible for current outlays. To give the right weight
to lagged independent variables explaining current outlays, we use weighted averages of
12As customary, Alaska, District of Columbia and Hawaii have been excluded. Usually those states tend
to be excluded to facilitate comparison with previous research. Another reason, and probably a better
one, however, is that they attract a disproportionate amount of federal spending for either aministrative
reasons (DC) or strategic reasons (Alaska and Hawaii receive a substantial share of defense spending).
This could render the political motivations behind an observed distribution less recognizable.
13Summary statistics are reported in the Statistical Appendix.
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lagged Pis, where the weights are determined by the spend-out rates utilized in oﬃcial
forecasts. Hence, since we know that approximately 60% of aggregate federal expenditure
is spent within one year, and assuming that the rest is spent two years later, we regress
outlays at time t on the weighted average of two lagged variables, i.e. Pisw = 0.6∗Pist−1+
0.4 ∗Pist−2.
Hypotheses 1 and 2. We begin our analysis by considering the role of electoral
competition in the presidential electoral race. Hence, we compare the relative impact of
the closeness of the presidential elections in each state with that of the share of votes
obtained by the president in the last election14. A negative sign of the closeness variable
should be regarded as support for the idea that the president tends to direct resources to
marginal states in order to increase his chances of re-election. A positive sign of the share
of presidential votes should instead be seen as evidence that incumbents tend to reward
states that show their support in elections. We also take into account the fact that not all
states have the same weight in presidential elections by including the number of electoral
votes per capita by state.
The closeness of the past election is, however, not necessarily the best measure to
identify swing states. We, therefore, generate an indicator of long term swing which is
based on the number of times a state swung its support from a party to another in last
four presidential elections15.
Hypothesis 3. As previously discussed, the partisanship of diﬀerent representatives
can have an important eﬀect on budget allocation since cooperation between diﬀerent
political actors belonging to the same party is likely to occur. In particular, the president
acting as a party leader may divert funds toward state governors and state representatives
14Hypothesis 1 and 2 are diﬀerent because, although correlated, the closeness and the presidential share
of votes measure two separate electoral phenomena. First, they can be diﬀerent when there are more
than two candidates. More importantly, however, they are diﬀerent because while an electoral race can
be equally "close" in states where the president has won or lost to the opponent, the share of presidential
votes will necessarily be diﬀerent when the president wins.
15We have also used two other measures of electoral volatility. One is a moving average of the frequency
of swings from one party to the other that starts from the 1964 election. The other is an indicator of
short term volatility represented by a dummy equal to one for the states that switched their support in
the last election. Our results do not change when we use such alternative measures. Further details can
be found in the online statistical appendix.
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belonging to his own party. Hence, we consider a series of dummy variables to capture
various levels of partizan alignment between central powers and state governments. We
first create three dummy variables to reflect the political alignment of state governors
with, respectively, the president and the majorities in the House and in the Senate. In a
further specification we also consider the possibility that funds allocation to a given state
is facilitated by party alignment between the governor and the majority of state delegates
to the House or the governor and both senators. We then consider the potential eﬀect of
having the president and a majority of state delegates in the House, or the president and
both senators from a given state, belonging to the same party. Finally, we consider the
potential advantage of having a majority of state delegates to the House belonging to the
House majority party or having both senators belonging to the Senate majority.
We are aware that testing our hypotheses separately has a major limitation because,
by considering one element at time, we can miss relevant correlations and incorrectly
estimate some eﬀects. For this reason we run a regression including all the Pisw vectors
in one equation of the form:
FEDEXPst = αs + βt +
X
i
θi1Pist + θ2Zst + st, (3)
The results we get from equation (3) provide the big picture that is missed when
focussing on specific channels of influence and provide an important robustness check.
3. Results
3.1. Swing and Ideological Bias
In Table 2 we focus on presidential elections to test the swing voter hypothesis and contrast
it with the potential presence of ideological bias. Column 1 shows that, while the share
of presidential votes in the past election displays a positive and significant coeﬃcient, the
closeness of the same election has no significant eﬀect16. In column 2 we consider the swing
16Concerning the economic variables, states with higher income per-capita receive significantly less, as
do states with larger population. The percentage of aged population also has a positive and significant
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variable and we find again no evidence in support of the swing voter hypothesis, while the
share of presidential vote has always a positive and significant eﬀect17. Depending on the
specification considered, the diﬀerence in spending between a state with maximum share
of presidential vote and a state with the minimum of such share goes from $536 (column
1) to $908 (column 2) per capita per year, which implies that one standard deviation in
the share of presidential vote is worth 97-164 $. These findings are in line with some of the
existing literature. For example, Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Couch and Shughart
(1998) find a positive correlation between spending at the state level and Roosvelt share
of votes in 1932, and Wright (1974) finds no eﬀect of the closeness of the presidential
race18.
To summarize, we find that the ideological bias toward safe states is substantial in
terms of both magnitude and statistical significance. We do not find instead any evidence
of the refined targeting of swing and marginal states that some formal models seem to
suggest. Assuming that electors cast their vote depending on the amount of spending
they receive and also on their ideological aﬃnity to a party, the swing voter bias should
come from the fact that moderate voters (who are indiﬀerent between two parties) can be
more easily convinced to switch their vote in favor of the party that has rewarded them
with spending. However, as Dixit and Londregan (1996) point out, the electoral return
from a dollar of spending is higher when targeted to an electorate whose preferences the
politician understands well. Hence, although the vote of the moderate electors may be
“cheaper” to buy, the informational advantage and ability of parties to target funds more
eﬃciently to their supporters can explain why allocating more spending to states with
eﬀect. The percentage of children in schooling age has instead a negative and significant eﬀect, while
the unemployment rate is completely uncorrelated with aggregate spending per capita. The signs and
significance of those coeﬃcients remain substantially the same in all the subsequent specifications.
17One obvious concern is that the significance of our estimates could be heavily conditioned by mul-
ticollinearity among the independent variables. To verify that the correlations of our predictors do not
significantly inflate the estimation of their standard errors, we calculate the Variance Inflation Factor for
all the regressions we present in this work. Here, as well as all the subsequent regressions, we find that
that multicollinearity has a very limited impact on the results of all the regressions. A description of the
methodology and detailed results are reported in the statistical appendix.
18Our results are also consistent with the findings of Stromberg (2004), who shows how, when state
fixed eﬀects are included in the regressions, evidence that swing states received more federal support
under the New Deal vanishes.
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many loyal voters can deliver a better electoral return than targeting areas with many
swing voters.
3.2. Party Alignment
In this section we explore the eﬀect of partizan alignment between central and state
government. Our analysis provides support for the idea that partisanship matters and
that political actors exchange favors and policies within the party boundaries. Column
1 of Table 3 shows that the coeﬃcient of the alignment between the president and the
governor in a given state has a positive and statistically significant impact. The size of
the coeﬃcient is also relevant, implying a transfer of approximately 135-138 $ per capita
per year. On the other hand, we find that the eﬀect of alignment of governors with the
majority in either chamber of Congress is not significant. This is especially important
because it shows both the relevance of party aﬃliation at diﬀerent levels of governance
and the prominent role of the president in the budget process as a party leader.
In column 2, we include other alignment variables. The significance and magnitude of
the alignment between governors and the president appears unaﬀected by the introduction
of new variables. Other alignment variables appear to have no statistically significant
impact. The only exception is represented by having a majority of state delegates to
the House belonging to the same party of the president. This again suggests that the
widespread emphasis on the role of the House in the allocation of the federal budget can
obscure the important role played by both the president and the party aﬃliation19.
The role of parties in American politics has been reconsidered in recent research and
new evidence about party cohesion casts some doubts on the common view that American
parties are weak organizations, with limited ideological divide (Rohde, 1991). If parties are
influential, then the president, as a party leader, may favor legislative districts controlled
19To take into account possible multicollinearity we also run separate regressions for diﬀerent forms
of alignment. The results (available in the online statistical appendix) remain unchanged, with the
exception of the alignment between the majority of state delegates and the House Majority, which has
now a negative impact. This is not surprising if we consider that the House has been mostly opposed
to the president in the period we consider (with the exception of the period 1993-94). To confirm this,
when we directly include alignments with the President (column 2 of Table 3), this result vanishes.
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by members of his party. By showing that the president is able to target more funds toward
states that are controlled by state governors belonging to his party, we find good evidence
in support of the theoretical literature that gives prominence to political parties and party
leaders in shaping public policies. Consistently with Levitt and Snyder (1995), who find
that democratic districts received more federal spending under the Carter administration
than under the Reagan administration, we also find that state representatives opposing
the president bring less funds to their states as compared to representatives aligned with
the president.
For what concerns the relationship between the president and the state governors,
Carsey and Wright (1998) find that votes in gubernatorial elections crucially depend on
presidential approval rate. On the other hand, governors can play an important role in
presidential elections as suggested by the attention the media devote to the ability of state
governors to “deliver” the vote of their state. The casual evidence on the privileged par-
tizan link between president and governors is abundant20. The endorsement of governors
also plays a fundamental role in the selection of presidential candidates during primaries21
and the governors associations underline their important role in shaping federal policies22.
Uncovering that the partisanship of state governors and president is an important deter-
minant of the distribution of federal funds to the states, our study provides evidence of
an eﬀective link between governors and the president through political parties.
3.3. Robustness
We now check if our results are robust to a diﬀerent specification, in which various eﬀects
are considered at the same time. In Table 4 we test simultaneously the diﬀerent, though
20In a recent interview, following the recent US presidential election of 2004, Mitt Romney, Governor
of Massachussets declared that “for republican governors, it means we have an ear in the White House,
we have a number we can call, we have access that we wouldn’t have otherwise had, and that’s of course
helpful” (Gov. , Washington Post, Monday, November 22, 2004)
21The Republican Governors’ Association reports that “Presidential candidates hailing from out of state
can trade on a governor’s name cachet and fund-raising network, while governors can gain a powerful
ally in the Oval Oﬃce if their horse wins the race” (Larry Sabato on interview the by Kenneth P.
Vogel,Wednesday June 18, 2003, The News Tribune).
22Both the Republican and Democratic Governors’ Associations explicitely state on their website their
intent to influence federal policies.
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not necessarily conflicting, hypotheses.
From columns 1 it is clear that all the results previously obtained on individual vari-
ables (or group of variables) are substantially confirmed by this check. In particular, the
share of votes for the president and the party alignment between the president and the
governors have a positive impact and are statistically significant at the 5% level. The
alignment of the president with the majority of state delegates in the House is positive
and significant at 10% level. As discussed in the previous section, many reasons can in-
duce a president to support friendly governors. To shed further light on this relationship,
in column 2 we introduce a dummy equal to 1 if the state has a gubernatorial election
in a given year and we also interact this dummy with the governor-president alignment
variable. If the president supports the re-election prospects of friendly governors then the
interaction term should be positive. This turns out to be the case: while the size and sig-
nificance of all other variables are only marginally aﬀected, presidents appear to support
friendly governors particularly in their re-election years. This corroborates our findings
about both the presidential pork-barrel and the privileged relationship with governors
from the same party.
In column 3 we add a number of further controls that previous studies have identified
as determinants of the federal budget allocation. We consider the role of committee
membership, focussing on the most influential committees in the budget process. We use
as explanatory variables the number of members by state in the Appropriation, Budget,
Ways and Means, and Rules committees of the House. We also include the electoral
turnout in presidential elections and a dummy variable for having a democratic president.
To take into account overrepresentation we follow Atlas et al. (1995) and introduce the
number of senators per capita. We find that having a democratic president substantially
increases overall spending (more than 1000 $ yearly per capita). Overrepresentation is
positive and significant23. We do not find any evidence that turnout has any impact on
the allocation process. Finally we find that having members in the Ways and Means
committee has a positive eﬀect (around 76 $ per capita per member). This confirms the
23One standard deviation in the number of Senators per capita is worth around 1,200 $ in per capita
spending. This is consistent with the finding of Atlas et al. (1995).
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results that Alvarez and Saving (1997) obtain in their cross-section study. On the other
hand, we do not find evidence that other prestige committees distort federal funds24.
Concerning our main variables of interest, we find that the gain from electing a majority
of delegates in the House who are on the president’s side is almost 100 $ per capita.
Again, we find that the party alignment between the president and the governor, as well
as the share of presidential votes in the last election, positively aﬀect federal expenditure.
The magnitude of the governor-president alignment variable is virtually insensitive to the
change in specification and, also in this case, we find that substantially more funds are
received by friendly governors during their re-election year.
To sum up this section, our results are quite robust to changes in the specification
adopted and to joint consideration of various theories. We find that economic and de-
mographic characteristics are very important explanatory variables of the allocation of
the budget to the states, but are not suﬃcient to explain the disparities in the amounts
received. Some states receive disproportionate amounts of money for reasons essentially
linked to politics and to the budget allocation process. In particular, we find that the
president turns out to have an important role. We also provide support for partisan the-
ories, since there is evidence that the president rewards his “core voters” and members
(governors and representatives) of his own party.
4. Conclusions
A common view about the US federal budget is that the president influences the big
macroeconomic aggregates while individual congressmen bargain over the territorial dis-
tribution of funds in order to bring resources to their constituents. This study shows that
presidents are also engaged in tactical distribution of federal funds to the states. This
conclusion is supported by a number of findings concerning the relation of federal spend-
ing with both the results of presidential elections and the party aﬃliation of the president.
States that display large support for the presidential party tend to be rewarded. States
24These findings seem consistent with the existing literature, which tend to show that the eﬀect of
committees can usually be found on very specific spending programs rather than on large aggregates.
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where the governor belongs to the same party of the president receive more founds, while
states that have a delegation in the House which is predominantly opposed to the pres-
ident tend to be penalized. These results also seem to show that parties are important
players and that the president tend to act as a party leader.
Congressional pork-barrel is often viewed as a common and almost inevitable con-
sequence of representative democracy where elected representatives use federal funds in
order to buy political support. However, presidents themselves, as elected representatives
of broader constituencies, are not immune from the same problem. Starting from the ’80,
all presidencies have put forward proposals for the introduction of presidential line item
veto 25 and expanded impoundment control aiming at increasing the power of the pres-
ident to control unnecessary congressional pork-barrel spending. These proposals have
raised the suspicion of a possible change in the balance of power between executive and
Congress mainly because the impoundment power, before the 1974 budget act, has been
extensively used by the presidency to override congressional budget priorities. However,
whether this shift in power might be desirable or not depends, among other factors, on
whether the executive could be a more eﬀective body in controlling pork-barrel spending.
Our study casts some doubts on the disciplining role of the executive and suggests that
the arguments for increasing the power of the president on budgetary matters should be
taken with due caution.
Our findings also shed light on alternative theories of electoral competition. We find
that states with large share of presidential supporters get more funds, but we do not find
that more federal monies are allocated to marginal or swing states. This evidence, while
corroborating the hypothesis of ideological bias formalized by existing theoretical models,
also suggests that further theoretical research on the ongoing link between parties and
“core supporters” would be very important to better understand distributive politics. If
one investigates the reasons behind voters’ loyalty, then it is hard to justify why loyal
25The line item veto was introduced in 1997 under the Clinton administration, but was declared
unconstitutional only one year later. Recently, in a news conference on November 2004 president G.W.
Bush has re-iterated the administration wish for the re-introduction of the line-item veto. For an overview
on the proposals of line item veto see Fisher (2004).
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voters should support political actors that systematically allocate funds to the advantage
of swing voters. Hence, in a context of repeated interactions between the electorate and
the politicians, loyalty in itself can be sustained only if political actors build a reputation
of rewarding their supporters. The need for such a long term perspective provides a further
rationale for the importance of parties in the process of allocating federal resources.
Further empirical research is certainly necessary to gain more insights on presiden-
tial pork barrel. In particular, an analysis of disaggregated spending categories could
be useful in order to find out if there are budget aggregates which are more prone to
presidential manipulation and whether diﬀerent spending categories are used to achieve
diﬀerent goals26. Nevertheless, by using panel data on a relatively long time span and by
testing various theories on the same dataset, we reached new and robust findings. These
results help in evaluating the validity of current theories and, importantly, call for new
theoretical developments in order to understand the long term reputation game between
voters and political actors.
26Since cooperation between members belonging to the same party can also be due to policy motivation,
it could happen that, when state governments have more discretion on how to spend certain funds, the
bias toward friendly governors might be bigger. An investigation along those lines goes beyond the scope
of this paper, but this is an interesting empirical question that we leave for further research.
18
References
[1] Alvarez, Michael R. and Jason L. Saving. 1997. Congressional committees and the
political economy of federal outlays, Public Choice 92: 55-73.
[2] Anderson, Gary. M. and Robert D. Tollison.1991. Congressional Influence and Pat-
terns of New Deal Spending, Journal of Law and Economics 34 : 161-75.
[3] Atlas, Cary M., Thomas W. Gilligan, Robert J. Hendershott and Mark A. Zupan.
1995. Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: who wins, who loses, and
why, American Economic Review 85: 624-629.
[4] Bickers Kenneth N. and Robert M. Stein. 2000. The Congressional Pork in a Repub-
lican Era, Journal of Politics 62: 1070-1086.
[5] Bond, James .R., Emily M. Bonneau, and Jon B.Cottril. 2004. The House Public
Works Committee and the Distribution of Pork-Barrel Projects. Chicago: APSA
meeting Proceedings.
[6] Carsey Thomas M., and Gavin Wright. 1998. State and National Factors in Guber-
natorial and senatorial Elections, American Journal of Political Science 42:994-1002.
[7] Carsey ThomasM. , and Barry Runquist. 1999. Party and Committees in Distributive
Politics: Evidence from Defence Spending, Journal of Politics 61:1156-1169.
[8] Copeland, Gary W. 1983. When Congress and president Collide: why presidents veto
legislation, Journal of Politics 45:696-710.
[9] Couch, Jim F. and William F. Shugart II .1998. The Political Economy of New Deal
Spending, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
[10] Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1986. Electoral Politics as a Redistrib-
utive Game, Journal of Politics, 48: 370-389.
[11] Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party
government in the House, Berkeley: University of California Press.
19
[12] Dasgupta, Sugato, Amrita Dhillon and Bhaskar Dutta. 2004. Electoral Goals and
Centre-State Transfers: A theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India.
Unpublished Manuscript.
[13] Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan. 1995. Redistributive Politics and Economic
Eﬃciency, American Political Science Review 89: 856-66.
[14] Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan. 1996. The Determinant of Success of Special
Interests in Redistributive Politics, The Journal of Politics 58:1132-1155..
[15] Dahlberg, Matz and Eva Johannsson. 2002. On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of
Incumbent Governments, American Political Science Review 96: 27-40.
[16] Edwards, George C. III.1980. presidential Influence in Congress, San Francisco: W.
H. Freeman.
[17] Fenno, Richard F. 1966. The Power of the Purse, Boston: Little Brown.
[18] Fenno, Richard. F.1973, Congressmen in Committees, Boston: Little Brown.
[19] Ferejohn, John A. 1974. Pork Barrel Politics, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
[20] Fishback, Price V., Shawn Kantor, and John J. Wallis. 2003. Can the New Deal
three-R’s be Rehabilitated? A county-by-county, program-by-program analysis, Ex-
plorations in Economic History 40: 278-307.
[21] Fisher, Louis. 2004. A presidential Item Veto, CRS Report for Congress.
[22] Fleck, Robert K. 2001a. Inter-party Competition, Intra-party Competition and Dis-
tributive Politics: a model and test using New Deal data, Public Choice 108: 77-100.
[23] Goss, Carol F. 1972. Military Committee Membership and Defense-Related Benefits
in the House of Representatives, The Western Political Quarterly 25: 215-33.
[24] Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Matthew D. McCubbins.1985. Congressional Appropria-
tions and the Electoral Connection, Journal of Politics 47: 59-82.
20
[25] Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1988. presidential Influence
on Congressional Appropriation Decisions, American Journal of Political Science
32:713-736.
[26] Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Keith Krehbiel. 2002. Heres the president, Wheres
the Party? U.S. Appropriations on Discretionary Domestic Spending, 1950-1999,
Leviathan 30: 115-37.
[27] Krehbiel D. Roderick,.1991. Information and Legislative Organization, University of
Michigan Press.
[28] Krehbiel, D. Roderick, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. Why Are
Congressional Committee Powerful, American Political Science Review 81: 929-945.
[29] Levitt, D. Steven, and James J. Snyder. 1995. Political Parties and the Distribution
of Federal Outlays”, American Journal of Political Science 39: 958-980.
[30] Lindbeck, Assar S. N. and Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987, Balanced-budget redistribution
as the outcome of political competition, Public Choice 52: 273-297
[31] Lindbeck, Assar S. N. and Jörgen W. Weibull.1993. A Model of Political Equilibrium
in a Representative Democracy, Journal of Public Economics 51: 195-209.
[32] McCarty,Nolan M. presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics,
The American Political Science Review, 94: 117-129.
[33] McKelvey, Richard. D., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1980. Vote Trading: An Experi-
mental Study, Public Choice 35: 151-84.
[34] Owens, John R. and Larry L. Wade. 1984. Federal Spending in Congressional Dis-
tricts, The Western Political Quarterly 37:404-23.
[35] Plott, Charles. 1968. Some Organizational Influences in Urban Renewal Decisions,
American Economic Review 58:306-311.
21
[36] Ray, Bruce A. 1981. Military Committee Membership in the House of Representative
and the Distribution of Federal Outlays, Western Political Quarterly, 34: 222-34.
[37] Rich, Michael J. 1989. Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants,
The American Political Science Review 83:193-213.
[38] Ritt, Leornard G. 1976. Committee Position, Seniority and the Distribution of Gov-
ernment Expenditures, Public Policy 24:469-97.
[39] Rodhe, David. 1991. Party and Leaders in the Postreform House, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
[40] Rodhe, David and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. presidential Veto and Congressional Re-
sponse: A Study of Institutional Conflict, American Journal of Political Science
29:397-427.
[41] Rundquist, Barry S. and David E. Griﬃth. 1976. An Interrupted Time-Series Test of
the Distributive Theory of Military Policy-Making, The Western Political Quarterly,
29: 620-626.
[42] Schick, Allan.1979. Whose Budget?, The Presidency and the Congress: A Shifting
Balance of Power? edited by W. S. Livingston, L. C. Dodd and R. L., Lyndon B.
Johnson School of Public Aﬀairs : Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.
[43] Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. The Institutional Foundations of
Committee Power, American Political Science Review 81: 85-104.
[44] Stein, Robert M. 1981. The Allocation of Federal Aid Monies: The Synthesis of the
Demand-side and Supply-side explanations, The American Political Science Review
75: 334-343.
[45] Strom, Gerald S. 1975. Congressional Policy-making: a test of a theory, Journal of
Politics 37:711-735.
[46] Strömberg, D. 2004. Radio Impact on Public Spending, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 119:189-221.
22
[47] Wallis, John J. 1987. Employment, Politics and Economic Recovery in the Great
Depression, Review of Economics and Statistics 69: 516-20.
[48] Wright, Gavin. 1974. The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: an econometric
analysis, Review of Economics and Statistics, 56: 30-38.
23
Table 1: Average real percapita federal outlays by state during 1982-2000
2000 real US Dollars percapita
State Average federal outlays percapita
Alabama $5,339.52
Arkansas $4,713.85
Arizona $4,992.98
California $5,210.48
Colorado $5,277.46
Connecticut $5,912.66
Delaware $4,477.32
Florida $5,238.06
Georgia $4,564.36
Iowa $4,564.12
Idaho $4,682.08
Illinois $4,183.07
Indiana $4,057.55
Kansas $5,107.32
Kentucky $4,810.72
Luoisiana $4,748.89
Massachusets $6,112.77
Maryland $7,428.26
Maine $5,345.58
Michigan $4,030.17
Minnesota $4,316.81
Missouri $6,176.43
Mississippi $5,324.57
Montana $5,512.15
North Carolina $4,137.82
North Dakota $6,182.13
Nebraska $4,836.17
New Hampshire $4,371.64
New Jersey $4,670.97
New Mexico $7,279.27
Nevada $4,585.21
New York $5,108.39
Ohio $4,442.29
Oklahoma $4,861.50
Oregon $4,320.66
Pennsylvania $5,074.75
Rhode Island $5,493.86
South Carolina $4,815.52
South Dakota $5,430.08
Tennessee $5,002.15
Texas $4,403.46
Utah $4,475.27
Virginia $7,636.12
Vermont $4,430.62
Whashington $5,482.99
Wisconsin $3,942.40
West Virginia $5,016.49
Wyoming $5,065.97
Table 2: Swing and Ideological Bias
Dependent variable: real percapita federal outlays, 1982-2000
(1) (2)
Dependent  Variable fedexp fedexp
 Share of vote for the incumbent president 1821.43 1076.899
(2.75)*** (2.34)**
 Closeness -615.15
(1.46)
 Swing -139.3107
(1.25)
 Electoral votes percapita 386.04 345.1779
(1.72)* (1.55)
 Observations 864 864
 R-squared 0.9353 0.9347
OLS regressions; Robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
In all regressions the following controls are included: income, unemployment, population, percentage of aged, percentage of children, 
state fixed effects, year fixed effects, constant term. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in the online statistical appendix.
Table 3: Party Affiliation
Dependent variable: real percapita federal outlays, 1982-2000
(1) (2)
Dependent  Variable fedexp fedexp
 Alignment Governor-President 134.904 137.917
(2.35)** (2.52)**
 Alignment Governor-House 100.720 100.078
(1.54) (1.56)
 Alignment Governor-Senate  12.3287 36.8956
(0.28) (0.86)
 Alignment between the Governor and the majority of 
state delegates in the House -5.3423
(0.11)
Alignment between the Governor and the two state
senators   -99.7257
(1.60)
Alignment between the President and the two state
senators 22.1627
(0.39)
 Alignment between the President and the majority of 
state delegates in the House 235.273
(3.02)***
 Alignement between the majority of state delegates in 
the House and the House majority 71.001
(0.93)
 Alignement between the two senators of the state and 
the Senate majority 36.5556
(0.76)
 Observations 864 864
 R-squared 0.9273 0.9326
OLS regressions; Robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
In all regressions the following controls are included: income, unemployment, population, percentage of aged, percentage of children, state fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, constant term. The alignment variables are dummies equal to one when partizan alignment occurs and zero otherwise. 
Detailed definitions of all  variables are reported in the online statistical appendix.
Table 4: Robustness Check
Dependent variable: real percapita federal outlays by program, 1982-2000
(1) (2) (2)
Dependent Variable fedexp fedexp
 Allignment Governor-President 130.328 118.372 126.028
(2.59)** (2.39)** (2.71)***
 Alignment Governor-House 79.655 82.446 103.506
(1.21) (1.25) (1.62)
 Alignment Governor-Senate  15.453 15.604 -6.824
(0.36) (0.36) (0.16)
 Alignment between President and the majority of 
state delegates in the House 84.470 -83.894 95.214
(1.75)* (1.74)* (1.97)*
 Share of vote for the incumbent president 931.566 927.714 846.2
(2.28)** (2.27)** (2.23)**
 Electoral votes percapita 338.140 339.285 -83.451
(1.42) (1.41) (0.38)
 Year of gubernatorial election -29.110 -33.372
(1.44) (1.70)*
 Alignement Governor-President  x  Year of 
gubernatorial election  61.575 63.519
(2.23)** (2.31)**
 Appropriation 18.831
(0.53)
 Ways & Means 76.618
(2.28)**
 Budget -18.715
(0.85)
 Rules 36.231
(0.63)
 Senators percapita 1,235.774
(2.67)**
 Democratic President 1,012.155
(10.56)***
 Turnout 6.736
(0.69)
 Observations 864 864 864
 R-squared 0.9367 0.9369 0.9413
OLS regressions; Robust t statistics in parentheses ( * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%)
In all regressions the following controls are included: income, unemployment, population, percentage of aged, percentage of children, state fixed
effects, year fixed effects, constant term. The alignment variables are dummies equal to one when partizan alignment occurs and zero otherwise.
Detailed definitions of  all variables are reported in the online statistical appendix.
Statistical Appendix
1 Summary Statistics (Table A1)
Table A1 reports summary statistics of the variables we used in the paper.
2 Multicollinearity (Tables A2-A4)
Most of the explanatory variables used in the regressions could be correlated
and therefore generate large standard errors. It is therefore important to verify
whether the low signicance of some variables, and especially of the closeness
and swing variables, is due to multicollinearity. For this purpose we use the
variance ination factor (Chatterjee, Hadi and Price 2000) which, for a variable
xj is given by:
V IF (xj) =
1
1 R2j
where R2j is the square of the multiple correlation coe¢ cient that results when
xj is regressed against all the other explanatory variables.
The variance of any bj coe¢ cient in a multiple regression is:
V ar [bj ] =
2 
1 R2j

Sxjxj
where 2 is the square of the random disturbance and Sxjxj is the variance of
the xj variable. The bigger R2j and therefore V IF (xj) = (
1
(1 R2j)
), the greater
is V ar [bj ], for a given level of 
2
Sxjxj
. An informal rule of thumb applied by most
analysts (Chatterjee, Hadi and Price, 2000) is that a variance ination factor in
excess of 20 may be evidence of multicollinearity.
In column 1 of table A2 we report the VIF relative to the regressions of
table 2. In column 1 (which refers to column1 of Table 2) the variance ination
factor turns out to be 8.78 for the share of the presidential vote and and 7.12 for
the closeness of the last presidential election. This means that the collinearity
of these two variables with the other predictors is acceptable and does not
signicantly inate the estimation of their standard errors. In the second column
of table A2 (which refers to column 2 in Table 2) we obtain a VIF of 2.97 for
the presidential share and of 2.13 for the swing variable. Hence, again, we can
exclude that the low signicance of the swing variable is due to multicollinearity.
The only variable for which we detect a potential multicollinearity problem is
the number of presidential electoral votes per capita with a V IF = 41:02 which
means that the standard error of this coe¢ cient is highly inated. Therefore, we
should use caution in stating that the coe¢ cient of this variable is not signicant
as it appears in the regression of column 2. In column 1 the number of electoral
votes per capita is signicant at the 10% level, again indicating that one should
not underestimate the relevance of such variable.
1
In Table A3 we report the results referred to Table 3 in the paper. In this
case all variables display a VIF which is well below the threshold we established
and therefore we can conclude that multicollinerarity is not a problem in these
specications.
Table A4 (which refers to Table 4 in the paper) is potentially the most prob-
lematic, since we include a number of indicators of alignment that are probably
correlated. However, it appears from the VIFs that multicollinearity should not
play a big role in inating the standard errors of such variables. Once again,
instead, we nd that multicollineraity is a problem for the overrepresentation
variables, namely the number of senators per capita and the number of elec-
toral votes per capita. In the case of senators per capita this is not su¢ cient to
render the estimation insignicant (the coe¢ cient is in fact signicat at the 5%
level). In the case of electoral votes per capita we get an insignicant coe¢ cient
but this results should be clearly interpreted with some caution. Nevertheless,
overrepresentation represents only a control factor for our regressions and the
important point is that our variables of interest do not appear to su¤er from a
multicollinearity problem.
3 More on the swing-voter hypothesis (Table A5)
In the paper we reach the conclusion that swing states do not receive more
federal funds, while states where the president obtains a larger share of votes
tend to be rewarded. Our conclusion does not depend on the specic measure
we use. In the paper we dene a swing state in the following way:
 Dene swing_last as a dummy equal to 1 if the state swung at the last
presidential election. Let i = 1; 2; 3; 4 indicate the four previous presiden-
tial elections at each given time. Also, t indicates the years and k = 1; :::48
indicates a state; then
swing1kt =
4X
i=1
swing_lastkt=4 :
In other words, swing1 (indicated in the table as Long term swing 4 years
average) is the average of swing_last over the previous four elections.
In this Appendix we report regressions where two alternative measures have
been used. In column 1 of Table A5 we report regressions where swing_last has
been used instead of swing. In column 2 of table A5 we use instead a variable
dened as follows:
 Let i = 1; 2; :::N indicate at each given time all previous presidential
elections since 1964. Also, t indicates the years and k = 1; :::48 indicates
a state; then
swing2kt =
NX
i=1
swing_lastkt=N :
2
In other words, swing2 (indicated in the table as Long term swing since
1964) is in this case the average of swing_last over all elections between
1964 and t.
The results in table A5 show that such variations make very little di¤erence.
Our results are robust to the use of such alternative variables and continue
to support the idea that swing states do not have any statistically signicant
advantage in terms of the receipt of federal funds.
In the column 3 of Table A5 we report an additional specication with
respect to the swing-voter hypothesis. While we show that swing states do not
receive more funds, it is still possible that the direction of the swing matters.
In other terms, a greater allocation of funds could be expected for states that
swing in the direction of the president as opposed to states that move away
from him. Thus, in column 3 we introduce a dummy variable equal to 1 for
states that swung in the direction of the president in the last election and an
interaction term between this dummy and the swing variable. Both the dummy
and the interaction turn out to be statistically insignicant. We conclude from
this analysis that swing states do not receive more federal funds.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Federal Expenditure per Capita* 912 5066.518 983.5352 3005.729 8824.92
Alignment Governor-President 960 0.40625 0.4913883 0 1
Alignment Governor-House 960 0.5979167 0.4905742 0 1
Alignment Governor-Senate 960 0.5208333 0.4998262 0 1
Alignment between Governor and the 
majority of state delegates to House
960 0.421875 0.4941162 0 1
Alignment between Governor and the 960 0.284375 0.4513514 0 1
two senators**
Alignment between President and the 960 0.2645833 0.441341 0 1
two senators**
Alignment between President and the 960 0.5333333 0.4991477 0 1
majority of state delegates to House
Alignment between the majority of state 960 0.5916667 0.4917816 0 1
delegates to House and House majority 
Alignment between the two senators 960 0.3291667 0.4701555 0 1
and the Senate majority
Appropriation 960 1.734375 1.430804 0 8
Ways & Means 960 0.5104167 0.7362899 0 4
Budget 960 0.8104167 1.107137 0 6
Rules 960 0.3177083 0.6161698 0 3
Closeness in Past Presid. Election 960 0.1377484 0.1058159 0.0015169 0.5220283
Share of Votes for President 960 0.5121536 0.0898193 0.2465447 0.7450179
State Elect. Votes per Capita 960 2.714539 1.024855 1.527064 6.616543
Senators per Capita 960 0.9661192 0.9851338 0.0588056 4.411028
Swing 912 0.3723246 0.2042428 0 1
Democratic President 960 0.4 0.4901533 0 1
Gubernatorial election year 960 0.2625 0.4402222 0 1
Turnout 960 61.02875 6.571284 46.1 75.6
Income per Capita* 960 22954.47 4292.623 13796.28 41446.37
Unemployment 960 6.074167 2.200156 2.2 18
Total Population 960 5217.995 5497.381 453.409 34010.38
Share of population aged above 65 960 0.1239534 0.0199277 0.0468377 0.3663689
Share of Population aged 5-17 960 0.1910132 0.0226012 0.0233483 0.6194438
Notes. *Federal Expenditure and Income are expressed in real value (year 2000).  
**These variables take value equal to 1 when both senators are of the same political colour of, respectively,  t
the Governor and the Presiden
Table A2: VIF relative to the coefficients of the regressions in table 2
Variable (1) (2)
electoral votes per capita 41.91 41.02
share of votes for the president 8.76 2.97
closeness 7.27
swing 2.13
Table A3: VIF relative to the coefficients of the regressions in table 3
Variable (1) (2)
Alignment Governor-President 3.59 3.69
Alignment Governor-House 4.03 4.62
Alignment Governor-Senate 1.67 1.75
Alignment between the  Governor and the 2.03
majority of state delegates to the House
Alignment between the  Governor and 1.96
two state senators
Alignment between the President and the 14.13
majority of state delegates in the House
Alignment between the President and the 1.63
two state senators
Alignment between the majority of state 13.70
delegates in the House and the House majority
Alignment between the two senators of the 1.60
State and the Senate majority
Table A4: VIF relative to the coefficients of the regressions in table 4.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Alignment Governor-President 3.61 3.84 3.91
Alignment Governor-House 4.05 4.06 4.14
Alignment Governor-Senate 1.68 1.68 1.73
Alignement between the President and a 2.35 2.35 2.54
majority of state delegates to the House
Share of votes for the incumbent President 3.27 3.27 3.38
Electoral votes per capita 43.98 43.99 112.13
Year of gubernatorial election 2.61 2.62
Alignement Governor-President x Year of 
gubernatorial election 2.39 2.40
Appropriation 9.46
Ways & Means 3.90
Budget 3.74
Rules 3.79
Senators per capita 477.91
Democratic President 17.17
Turnout 10.19
Table A5: More on Swing Bias
Dependent variable: real percapita federal outlays, 1982-2000
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent  Variable fedexp fedexp fedexp
 Share of vote for the incumbent president 1154.21 1078.26 1169.77
(2.66)** (2.29)** (2.65)**
 Long term Swing (4 years)  -16.51
(0.09)
 Swing_last 26.7636
(0.57)
 Long term Swing (since 1964) -147.04
(1.02)
 State where the President won -113.55
(0.91)
State where the President Won x Long term
Swing -140.90
(0.66)
 Electoral votes percapita 370.24 360.82 302.01
(1.70)* (1.62) (1.41)
 Observations 864 864 864
 R-squared 0.9348 0.9351 0.9369
OLS regressions; Robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
In all regressions the following controls are included: income, unemployment, population, percentage of aged, percentage of children,
 state fixed effects, year fixed effects, constant term.
Table A6: More on Alignments
Dependent variable: real percapita federal outlays, 1982-2000
(2) (3) (4)
Dependent  Variable fedexp fedexp fedexp
 Alignment between Governor and the majority of state 
delegates in the House -39.4412
(0.99)
Alignment between Governor and the two state
senators   -74.9903
(1.39)
Alignment between President and the two state
senators 15.6720
(0.27)
 Alignment between President and  the majority of state 
delegates in the House 175.688
(3.13)***
 Alignment between the majority of state delegates in 
the House and the House majority -154.624
(2.61)**
 Alignment between the two senators of the state and 
the  Senate majority -5.9300
(0.14)
 Observations 864 864 864
 R-squared 0.9271 0.9302 0.9292
OLS regressions; Robust t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
In all regressions the following controls are included: income, unemployment, population, percentage of aged, percentage of children, state fixed
effects, year fixed effects, constant term. The alignment variables are dummies equal to one when partizan alignment occurs and zero otherwise.
Detailed definitions of all  variables are reported in the online statistical appendix
List of variables: Definitions and Sources 
 
 
From the Statistical Abstract of the US and the Bureau of Statistics 
 
Federal expenditure: real federal expenditure by state (year 2000 constant USD per 
capita).  
 Income: real income (year 2000 constant USD per capita). 
Population: state population divided by 1000. 
Turnout: total percentage of voting population in the last presidential election. 
Percentage of Aged: share of the population over 65 years old by state. 
Percentage of Children: share of the population between 5 and 17 years old by state. 
Unemployment: unemployment rate. 
Democratic president: dummy variable equal to 1 when the President is democratic, 
and zero when the President is republican. 
Governor election year: dummy variable equal to 1 during a governor election year 
and zero otherwise. 
 
 
Authors’ elaboration on data from the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Closeness: distance in the percentage of vote (by state) between the winner of the 
presidential race and the runner up. 
Share of vote for the incumbent president: share of votes for the current President 
in the last presidential elections. 
Last election swing: dummy equal to 1 if the state swung at the last presidential 
election. 
Swing: moving average of “Last election swing” over the four previous presidential 
elections at each given time. 
Long term swing: average of “Last election swing” from 1964 to the last election. 
Alignment Governor-President: dummy variable equal to one when the party 
affiliation of the governor is the same as that of the President, and zero otherwise. 
Alignment Governor-House: dummy variable equal to one when the party affiliation 
of the governor is the same as that of the majority of the House, and zero otherwise. 
Alignment Governor-Senate: dummy variable equal to one when the party 
affiliation of the governor is the same as that of the majority of the Senate, and zero 
otherwise. 
Senators percapita: 2000/Population. 
Electoral votes percapita: (1000×Electoral votes)/Population 
Alignment between the governor and the two state senators: dummy variable 
equal to one when the governor is from the same party of both senators in the state, 
and zero otherwise. 
Alignment between the Governor and the majority of state delegates in the 
House: dummy variable equal to one when the governor is from the same party as the 
majority of state delegates in the House, and zero otherwise. 
Alignment between the President and the two state senators: dummy variable 
equal to 1 if both senators from a state are of the same party of the President. 
Alignment between the President and the majority of state delegates in the 
House: dummy variable equal to 1 if a majority of state delegates in the House are of 
the same party of the President. 
Alignment between the majority of state delegates in the House and the House 
majority: dummy variable equal to 1 if a majority of state delegates to the House are 
in the majority party in the House. 
Alignment between the two senators of the state and the Senate majority: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a majority of state delegates to the Senate are in the majority 
party in the Senate. 
 
 
From the Official Congressional Directory and from Nelson and Bensen 
(1993). 
 
Appropriation: number of members in the House appropriation committee by state. 
Budget: number of members in the House Budget committee by state. 
Rules: number of members in the House Rules committee by state. 
Ways & Means: number of members in the Ways and Means committee by state. 
 
 
     
